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CASENOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: REPUTATION VERSUS DEFAMATION:
AN APPLICATION OF New York Times AND Gertz TO PRIVATE
SPEECH-Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The publication of false statements that injure reputation was traditionally unprotected by the first amendment.' However, since the
1964 landmark decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' the United
States Supreme Court has held that defamatory statements are entitled
to some constitutional protection. The Court's initial concern in New
York Times that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 3 has resulted in broad first amendment protection
for defamatory statements involving some type of public issue.
Today, twenty years after its decision in New York Times, the
United States Supreme Court has acted to limit the constitutional protection previously afforded to defendants in defamation actions. In Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,4 the Court decided
whether defamatory statements of a private nature are entitled to first
amendment protection. In concluding that such statements do not warrant constitutional protection, the Court has created an important precedent in defamation law.
This note will examine the approach that the United States Supreme Court has taken in defamation law. Through an analysis of Supreme Court decisions, including Dun & Bradstreet, the note will evaluate the Court's reaction to the inherent conflict between the plaintiff's
reputation and the defendant's freedom of expression. Finally, this note
will conclude that the Supreme Court should have applied an actual
malice standard in Dun & Bradstreet.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

The defendant, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., is a credit reporting
agency which falsely reported to five subscribers that the plaintiff,
I.
2.
3.
4.

See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 270.
105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
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Greenmoss Builders, Inc., was insolvent.' Greenmoss Builders learned
of the false reports through its bank. 6 Greenmoss Builders immediately
asked Dun & Bradstreet for a corrective notice and requested the7
names of the five subscribers who had received the false information.
Dun & Bradstreet initially denied these requests. However, eight days
later, after determining that its initial report was indeed false, Dun &
8
Bradstreet sent a corrective notice to the five subscribers. In the corrective notice, Dun & Bradstreet stated that Greenmoss Builders had
been mistaken for one of Greenmoss Builder's former employees who
had filed for bankruptcy.9 Dun & Bradstreet would not, however, reveal the names of the five subscribers. 10 Dissatisfied with the refusal,
Greenmoss Builders repeated its request for the names of the subscribers, but again Dun & Bradstreet refused. 1
Greenmoss Builders then brought a defamation action in the Ver12
mont Superior Court for Washington County. Seeking both compensatory and punitive damages, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant's false
report had injured Plaintiff's reputation." Following a jury trial, the
superior court awarded Plaintiff $50,000 in compensatory or presumed
4
damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.' Subsequently, Defendant
5
moved for a new trial on the grounds of an improper jury instruction.'
While the superior court granted Defendant a new trial, the Vermont
6
Supreme Court reversed and denied Defendant a new trial.'
On writ of certiorari, a sharply divided United States Supreme
7
Court affirmed the decision of the Vermont Supreme Court.' In attempting to define the possible first amendment protection of defamatory statements of a private nature, namely a credit report, the Supreme Court sought to maintain a balance between the competing
interests of reputation and freedom of expression.' 8 Thus, in Dun &
5. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2941 (1985).
6. Id.
7. id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2941-42.
10. Id.
Id. at 2942.
I.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Defendant argued that the judge's instructions permitted the jury to award both
presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice. See supra text accompanying
note 32.
16. Id.
17. Id. Justice Powell wrote the decision with which Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White concurred with the holding but wrote separate
opinions. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.
18. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/8
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Bradstreet, the United States Supreme Court examined the possibility
of extending first amendment protection to defamatory statements of a
private nature.
III.

BACKGROUND

The United States Supreme Court initially viewed defamation as
defined by state law, as not being entitled to first amendment protection. 19 The Court has traditionally classified defamatory statements as
words which are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth ... ."o Any benefit derived froma such words was outweighed by society's interest in order
and morality. 2 ' Therefore, defamatory statements were not considered

a form of freedom of expression and consequently were not protected

under the first amendment.
A. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan-The Beginning of Constitutional Protection
In the 1964 landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,22 the United States Supreme Court held that defamatory statements are entitled to limited constitutional protection.23 The plaintiff, a
public official in charge of supervising the Police Department of Montgomery, Alabama, alleged that the defendant, New York Times, had
libeled him by printing an advertisement concerning the police department's alleged efforts to terrorize Martin Luther King and his followers.2 4 Although the plaintiff's name did not appear in the advertisement, he indicated that the reference to police in general reflected on
his reputation by virtue of his position as supervisor. 25
The Supreme Court held that the libel law of Alabama was constitutionally deficient in that it failed to safeguard freedom of speech as
required by the first amendment of the United States Constitution.26 In
reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court made several important determinations. First, the Court viewed the advertisement as a criticism
19. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
20. Id. at 572. "Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander-the one
being, in general, written while the other in general is oral. . . . In either form, defamation
is an
invasion of the interest in reputation and good name." W. KEETON. D. DOBBS, R. KEETON
& D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 771 (5th ed. 1984).
See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) ("A communication is defamatory
if it tends to harm the
reputation of another so as to lower him in the estimation of the community .
21. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. Id. at 283.
24. Id. at 256-58.
25. Id. at 258.
26. Id. at 264.
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of official conduct rather than mere factual statements about an individual." Second, since the advertisement concerned civil rights, a major public issue, the Court determined that protection of the advertisement was consistent with the "profound national commitment that...
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen." 28a Third, the Court held that requiring a critic of official conduct
to guarantee the truth of all statements would inevitably lead to self29
censorship, which the first amendment is designed to deter. Fourth,
given the role of the New York Times in communicating information
on matters of the highest public concern, the Court found that the ad30
vertisement was not merely a commercial one. Finally, the Court es3 1 This standard precludes recovery
tablished an actual malice standard.
of damages by a public official for defamatory statements relating to
his or her official conduct absent a showing of actual malice, that is,
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of whether the statements
were false.3 2 Finding that there was no actual malice on the part of the
New York Times Company,"3 the United States Supreme Court created a constitutional privilege for good faith criticism of government
officials.
B.

Constitutional Protection Extended

Following the New York Times decision, the United States Supreme Court extended first amendment protection of defamatory statements. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,3 4 the Supreme Court held
that the first amendment of the Constitution protects defamatory state35
ments about public figures as well as public officials. The Court found
that just as in the case of a public official, a public figure may not
recover presumed or punitive damages for defamatory statements of a

27. Id. at 273.
28. Id. at 270-71. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (freedom of expression was designed to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 4 (1949) (debate on
public issues may well include unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials).
29. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
30. Id. at 266. See also Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
31. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 285-86.
34. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
35. Id. at 150. The University of Georgia football coach brought a defamation action alleging that the defendant's magazine had falsely accused the plaintiff of conspiring to fix a football
game. Id. at 135. The Supreme Court found that both the public's and the publisher's interests in
the circulation of the magazine were the same as the interests found in New York Times. Id. at
154. Moreover, the plaintiff's position as university football coach commanded a "sufficient continhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/8
uing public interest." Id. at 155.
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public nature absent a showing of actual malice. 36
While the constitutional protection of defamatory statements declared in New York Times and Curtis Publishing was premised upon
both the public nature of the statement and the public status of the
plaintiff, a later United States Supreme Court decision focused solely
on the public nature of the statement. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,31
the Supreme Court indicated that first amendment protection should
extend to any defamatory statement which involves "matters of public
or general concern." 38a The Court found that a matter of great public
interest, such as the proper enforcement of criminal laws in deterring
obscenity, cannot suddenly become less important because a private individual is involved. 39 The Supreme Court's interpretation of the first
amendment's commitment to robust debate on public issues extends to
"all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous."'4 0 The Supreme Court left open, however, the
question of whether the first amendment protects defamatory statements outside the area of public or general interest, and whether it
protects purely commercial communications made in the course of
1
business.4
C. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.-Private Plaintiffs
The United States Supreme Court's determination in Rosenbloom
that all defamatory statements of a public nature are entitled to constitutional protection was put to a stringent test in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc."2 Backing away from its earlier view in Rosenbloom, the Supreme
Court found that in a defamation action brought by a private figure,
there is no constitutional requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate actual malice on the part of the defendant in order to establish liability
43
for actual damages.

36. Id. at 154-55.
37. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
38. Id. at 44. Plaintiff, a distributor of nudist magazines, brought suit against Defendant, a
radio station, which had broadcast several news reports of the plaintiff's arrest for possession of
obscene literature. Id. at 32-33.
39. Id. at 43.
40. Id. at 43-44.
41. Id. at 44 n.12.
42. 418 U.S. 323 (1977). The plaintiff, Gertz, was a locally well-known lawyer who represented the family of a youth who was killed by a policeman. The defendant, the publisher of a
John Birch Society magazine, falsely accused Gertz of having helped "frame" the policeman and
of being a communist. Id. at 325.
43. Id. at 348. Instead, the Supreme Court allowed the use of a simple negligence standard
which examined whether the content of a factual misstatement would warn a reasonably prudent
editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential. Id. In Gertz, the Supreme Court permitted states
Published by eCommons, 1986
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In distinguishing between defamation actions brought by private
individuals and public figures, the Supreme Court explained that the
outcome in New York Times and Curtis Publishing was derived by
weighing the competing interests of plaintiff's reputation against defendant's freedom of expression." Applying the balancing of competing
interests in Gertz, the Supreme Court recognized the strong and legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for injury to
their reputation. 5 This interest was considered more threatened in
cases involving private individuals than in those dealing with public officials or public figures."' Consequently, the Supreme Court held that a
private individual may establish liability for damages for actual loss on
the basis of a negligence standard instead of having to meet the New
York Times actual malice standard. However, a private individual, like
public officials and public figures, may not recover presumed or punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice.47 Permitting juries to
award presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice, the Court reasoned, might result in the selective punishment of unpopular views. 48 The Supreme Court determined that the state's interest in allowing broader protection to private individuals is justified only
to the extent that such protection compensates for actual injury. 49 Accordingly, since presumed damages are awarded without proof of actual loss while seeking to redress injury to an individual's reputation,
and punitive damages seek to deter conduct which results in injury to
reputation, both types of damages may "inhibit the vigorous exercise of
First Amendment freedoms" 50 if awarded without a showing of actual
malice.
Beginning with New York Times and continuing through Gertz,
the United States Supreme Court has afforded constitutional protection
to defamatory statements of a public nature. In doing so, the Court has

to define the appropriate standard of liability in defamation actions brought by private individuals.
Id. at 347. See also Note, Private Lives and Public Concerns: The Decade Since 'Gertz v. Robert
Welch', 51 BROOKLYN L. REV. 425, 426-28 n.11 (1985).
44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
45. Id. at 348-49.
46. Id. at 345. The basis for this distinction was that private individuals are more vulnerable
to defamatory statements because private individuals lack meaningful access to the media to
counteract such statements. Id. at 344-45. Moreover, public officials and public figures generally
have voluntarily exposed themselves to an increased risk of harm to their reputations by entering
the public limelight. Id. at 345. Therefore, a private individual is deserving of greater protection
than a public official or public figure.
47. Id. at 349.
48. Id. at 350.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 349. For a detailed explanation of presumed damages as relating to defamation
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/8
actions, see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 621, comment a (1934).
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attempted to balance the plaintiff's and state's interest in reputation
with the defendant's interest in first amendment protection of freedom
of expression. While the status of the plaintiff may affect the extent of
protection from defamation, such protection is merely directed toward
the right to compensation for actual injury. In order to obtain presumed and punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant made such defamatory statements with actual malice. However, in
pronouncing the New York Times and Gertz decisions, the Supreme
Court allowed the possibility of permitting such damages in the absence of actual malice when the defamatory statements are not of a
public nature, but rather involve matters of private concern. The Supreme Court's decision in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders"'
addresses this issue.

IV.

ANALYSIS

In Dun & Bradstreet, the United States Supreme Court decided
whether first amendment protection previously afforded to defamation
should extend to private speech by determining if the rule of Gertz was
applicable to the facts of Dun & Bradstreet52 . Specifically, the Supreme Court determined whether a false credit report issued by a
credit reporting agency, which on its face involved no matter of great
public interest, is entitled to constitutional protection." A sharply divided Court concluded that the credit report was not entitled to first
amendment protection." Applying the balancing-of-interests standard
established in Gertz, the Supreme Court found that a credit report is
similar to other forms of private speech which have traditionally been
deserving of less constitutional protection.55 Furthermore, based upon
the "content, form, and context" 5 6 of the credit report, it was truly
speech of a private nature.5 7 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that in
a defamation action involving speech of a private nature, the state interest in providing effective remedies for defamation adequately supported recovery of both presumed and punitive damages without a
58
showing of actual malice.

51. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
52. Id. at 2941.
53. Id. at 2944.
54. Id. at 2954. See supra note 17 for the Justices' positions.
55. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2945-46.
56. Id. at 2947 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (a public employee's private speech has limited constitutional protection the degree of which will be based on
the content of the statement)).
57. Id.
Published58.by eCommons,
Id. at 2948. 1986
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Reputation Versus Freedom of Expression

The United States Supreme Court, in Dun & Bradstreet, declared
that the constitutional protection of defamatory statements found in
previous landmark decisions, such as New York Times and Gertz, focused upon a balancing of the competing interests of reputation and
freedom of expression. 5" Relying on this balance test, the Supreme
Court found that the reason for allowing presumed and punitive damages only upon a showing of actual malice on the part of the defendant
was to maintain an equilibrium between the plaintiff's and the state's
interest in reputation and the defendant's interest in freedom of expres1
sion. 60 While the interest in reputation is often strong and legitimate,"
the interest in freedom of expression concerning matters of public interest is at least equally important. 62 Speech63on matters of public concern
is at the core of first amendment values.
In balancing reputation with freedom of expression, the Supreme
Court determined that the interest of Plaintiff Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
and the state of Vermont in maintaining Plaintiff's reputation was
strong and legitimate."' On the other hand, the Supreme Court found
that the interest of Defendant Dun & Bradstreet in freedom of expression was deserving of less constitutional protection.65 Unlike previous
defamation actions which involved statements of a public nature, the
Supreme Court considered the credit report in Dun & Bradstreet
speech of a merely private concern. 66 In terms of the reputation/freedom-of-expression balance, which has traditionally served as a guideline for the constitutionality of defamation, the Court in Dun & Bradstreet establishes that when the defamation at issue involves mere
private speech, the balance tips in favor of reputation. Therefore the
defendant issuing the defamatory private statement is entitled to less

59. Id. at 2944 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974)).
60. Id. at 2945-46.
61. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (the protection
of reputation reflects upon the essential dignity of every human being). Id.
62. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (speech on public
issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of first amendment values); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (it is speech on public issues that is at the heart of first amendment protection).
63. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (speech involving public interest
is at the essence of self-government); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-8
(1970) (freedom of expression is essential as a means to self-realization, the discovery of truth,
participation in government decision making, and as an overall check on government processes).
See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 8-9, 20-21, 25-27, 55 (1960); Redish, The Value
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 617 (1982).
64. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2944-45.
65. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/8
66. Id.
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constitutional protection than when speech of a public nature is involved. Under these circumstances, presumed and punitive damages are
properly recoverable without the plaintiff's proving actual malice.
By permitting presumed and punitive damages in Dun & Bradstreet,
the United States Supreme Court has eliminated the actual malice
standard from defamation actions involving private speech. However, a
strong argument can be made that this rationale is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's rationale in Gertz.6 7 The Court in Gertz specifically held that a jury may not award presumed or punitive damages
absent a showing of actual malice. 68 Restrictions on such damages were
deemed necessary to uphold the first amendment value of freedom of
expression." Moreover, in Gertz, the Supreme Court found that presumed and punitive damages were "wholly irrelevant" to the furtherance of any valid state interest in reputation since the state's interest
was only valid to the extent of "actual injury. '"70 The Court further
found that Gertz did not apply to Dun & Bradstreet since Gertz involved public speech and Dun & Bradstreet involved private speech.
Because the Supreme Court did not apply Gertz when deciding Dun &
Bradstreet, it has resurrected the dangers addressed in Gertz, namely
that permitting presumed and punitive damages would chill conduct
involving speech. 7 1 This is most alarming in light of the fact that the
state's interest in reputation in Dun & Bradstreetis identical to the one
weighed in Gertz." This fact alone makes the Supreme Court's decision not to apply Gertz questionable. Perhaps a correct reading of
Gertz requires the use of the actual malice standard in all defamation
actions, regardless of whether the statement is of a public or private
73
nature.

67. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422 (1975); Ashdown,
Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61 MINN. L. REV. 645 (1977);
Comment, Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine Revisited, 54 TUL. L. REV. 1053 (1980); Note,
Private Lives and Public Concerns: The Decade Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, 51 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 425 (1985).
68.

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1965); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41 (1974).
70. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
69.

71. Id. See also Wiley & Frank, Complications for Libel Defense Increased by Greenmoss
Ruling, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 7, 1985, at 35, col. 1.
72.

Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2944.
73. See Utt, Defamation and the Supreme Court-A Rare Plaintiff Victory or a New
Trend Toward Allowance of Reputation Vindication?, Equitable Relief, Nov., 1985, at 1I,col. 3
Published
eCommons,
(on file by
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University of1986
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B. Public Speech/Private Speech Distinction
1. Defining Private Speech
The majority in Dun & Bradstreet permitted the recovery of both
presumed and punitive damages absent actual malice since the defamatory statements at issue were of a mere private concern.7 4 Looking specifically to the credit report's "content, form, and context . . .as revealed by the whole record," the Supreme Court concluded for four
reasons that the credit report was not speech of a public nature and
thereby was entitled to less constitutional protection. 6 First, the credit
report was regarded as speech solely in the individual interest of Defendant, a credit reporting agency, and the credit report's specific business audience.7 6 Second, the report was clearly false and damaging to
Plaintiff's business reputation. 77 Third, since the credit report was distributed to only five subscribers who were not able to disseminate the
information, the report did not involve any "strong interest in the free
flow of commercial information. 1 78 Fourth, the Supreme Court found
that in regard to advertising, the credit report was unlikely to be deterred by state regulation since it was motivated solely by profit.7 9 For
these reasons the United States Supreme Court has limited the first
amendment protection afforded to defamatory statements when those
statements are classified as private speech.
2.

Content Regulation

Not only is the rationale of the majority in Dun & Bradstreet inconsistent with the rationale of Gertz,80 the majority in Dun & Bradstreet may also be criticized as prohibiting speech on the basis of its
content. Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that
content-based regulations on speech must be narrowly tailored to ad-

74. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
75. Id. See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
76. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2947. See also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public
Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 455-56
(1978); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. I, 38-39 (1979).
77. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2947. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (commercial speech which is wholly
false or misleading warrants no constitutional protection); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36,
49 (1961); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-216 (1982).
78. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2947 (quoting Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 764).
See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
79. Dun & Bradstreet. 105 S. Ct. at 2947. See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404
U.S. 898 (1971).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/8
80. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
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vance a legitimate government interest."' Since the regulation in Dun
& Bradstreet limits protection of publishing the credit report because
of its economic content, the question arises as to whether such regulation is narrowly tailored to further a legitimate government interest.
This regulation is not narrowly tailored since the Supreme Court
has previously stated that presumed and punitive damages are too
blunt a regulatory instrument.82 The threat posed by this fear of a
broadly based regulation is increased by eliminating the requirement of
actual malice. Furthermore, in light of Gertz, the present regulation
does not further a legitimate government interest since the state's interest in reputation is identical to the one weighed in Gertz.8 3
3. Credit Report as Private Speech
The majority's characterization of the false credit report as private
speech is questionable since the characterization was apparently based
on the economic content of the speech.8 The United States Supreme
Court has consistently rejected the argument that economic speech is
entitled to less constitutional protection." The dissenting Justices argued that a credit report may be regarded as speech of a public nature." An announcement of bankruptcy is potentially of great concern
to residents of the community where the allegedly bankrupt company is
located. Additionally, bankruptcy involves various judicial mechanisms
which are implemented by federal law and which inevitably require the
fact of a bankruptcy to become a matter of public record. 87 Therefore,
the credit report in Dun & Bradstreet might be characterized as public
speech.
4.

Traditional Protection of Economic Speech

Even if the credit report is private speech, its economic content
allows the report to be classified as commercial speech which has traditionally received substantial first amendment protection.88 The United
States' economy is primarily based upon a free enterprise system. 89 In
81. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
794-95 (1978); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973). See also Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 853-58 (1970).
82. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
83. Dun & Bradstreet. 105 S. Ct. at 2945.
84. Id. at 2942.
85. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
86. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2961 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 476-87, 495 (1975) (28 U.S.C.A. §
1257(2) establishes federal jurisdiction for bankruptcy cases).
88. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
Virginia State 1986
Bd., 425 U.S. at 765. See also Maurer, Common Law Defamation and
Published89.by eCommons,

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 12:1

order to further numerous private economic decisions, courts should regard the free flow of commercial information as indispensable. 90 The
financial data, contained within Dun & Bradstreet's credit report certainly falls within the national system of commercial communication.
The credit report in Dun & Bradstreet should be entitled to substantial
first amendment protection.
Recognizing the importance of commercial speech in a predominantly free enterprise economy, most states have created a qualified
privilege for credit reports. 91 Based on the common law, this privilege
requires a plaintiff to demonstrate actual malice on the part of the defendant. 92 The occasional harm to the plaintiff was considered to be
slight in comparison to the benefit resulting to the free flow of commercial information.9" The rationale supporting the common-law privilege
for credit reports is reflected in the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Gertz, which indicates that permitting damages absent a
showing of actual malice would in effect chill the press. 94 By eliminating the actual malice requirement from defamation actions involving
speech of a private nature, the Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet
has disregarded the traditional common law recognition that credit reporting is susceptible to chilling damages.
C.

The Effect of Dun & Bradstreet

1. Vague Public Speech/Private Speech Distinction
The Supreme Court's standard for distinguishing public speech
from private speech is that of "content, form, and context of the
speech, as revealed by the whole record."' 95 The factors included in this
standard warrant the conclusion that future rulings on defamation actions involving private speech will be extremely fact-sensitive. While
the standard used in Dun & Bradstreet will allow the Supreme Court
flexibility in deciding future defamation actions on a case-by-case basis,
it also has a devastating chilling effect on commercial communications.

the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 72 GEo. L.J. 95, 96 (1983).
90. Virginia State Bd.. 425 U.S. at 765.
91. See Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1050 nn.86-87
(1971).
92. Datacon, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 465 F. Supp. 706, 708 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 601
F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1979).
93. Maurer, supra note 89, at 101.
94. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
95. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (1983). See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190
(1964) (first amendment freedom of expression requires a court to make an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of each case); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (the
Constitution enables a court to determine the meaning and application of the particular statements at issue in light of all the circumstances).
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By providing a vague standard for distinguishing between public speech
and private speech, the Court managed to chill the numerous reports of
commercial credit which are a vital component to a thriving creditoriented, commercial economy. 96 Furthermore-, the public speech/private speech distinction is arguably constitutionally void for vagueness. 7
The Supreme Court's vague judicial definition of the common-law
crime of defamation is similar to other ambiguous standards which traditionally have been prohibited as void for vagueness.' 8
Additionally, by failing to provide an effective public speech/private speech distinction, the United States Supreme Court has left defamation law wide open for future plaintiffs' abuse as they attempt to
classify the speech at issue as mere private speech. This unfortunate
result poses two immediate problems which the Court must ultimately
address. First, permitting presumed and punitive damages absent a
showing of actual malice renews the fear expressed by the Court in
Gertz of jury censorship of unpopular views.'9 Second, the vague standard set forth has a chilling effect on the defendant's ability to disseminate information to the public. Such an effect is contrary to first
amendment values which the Supreme Court has traditionally attempted to safeguard in its previous landmark defamation decisions. 10 0
2.

The Hidden Factor: A Media/Non-Media Distinction

The vagueness of the public speech/private speech distinction in
Dun & Bradstreet suggests that the underlying reason for the new
standard is due to some other factor left unaddressed by the Supreme
Court. The Court's previous defamation decisions declared that in addition to the nature of the speech at issue and the status of the plaintiff,
another important consideration was the status of the defendant. 1 0' In
New York Times the Supreme Court found that given the role of the
defendant, New York Times Company, in communicating information
to a large number of people, the defendant was clearly a speaker which
the first amendment sought to protect. 10 In Dun & Bradstreet, the defendant, a credit reporting agency, was not involved in communicating
information to a wide audience. In fact, the false credit report issued
by the defendant was distributed to only five subscribers who under the
96. See Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, 486 F.2d 25, 32 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 415 U.S.
985 (1984) (discussing credit transactions and empirical studies).
97. R. LAFAVE & W. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § II (1972).
98. Id.
99. Gertz. 418 U.S. at 350.
100. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254. See generally T.
EMERSON, supra note 63, at 6-8.
101. New York Times. 376 U.S. at 266.
102. Id.
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terms of the arrangement were not able to disseminate the credit information. 10 3 The effect of the Court's decision in Dun & Bradstreet was
to deny constitutional protection to a non-media defendant, thus creating a media/nonmedia distinction.
Media defendants, such as The New York Times Company, have
traditionally been afforded constitutional protection in order to preserve
the vitality of first amendment values.10 4 However, while allowing media defendants significant first amendment protection, the United
States Supreme Court has never specifically declared that such protection is limited to media defendants. 0 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has consistently rejected the idea that a defendant is entitled to greater
6
constitutional protection by virtue of its role in the media.'0 However,
the Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet has decided to afford less constitutional protection to a defendant by virtue of the defendant's position as a credit reporting agency.
Since both the status of the plaintiff-private corporation-and
the nature of the speech-credit report-are arguably similar to those
found in the Supreme Court's previous defamation decisions, it would
seem that the Court has decided Dun & Bradstreet on the basis of a
media/nonmedia defendant distinction. This distinction is alarming in
that had a media defendant, such as The New York Times Company,
issued false information about a corporation, the media defendant
would have been entitled to first amendment protection. 10 7 Therefore,
even if the Supreme Court decided Dun & Bradstreet on the basis of a
media/nonmedia distinction, the decision would still violate the first
amendment right of freedom of expression.
3. Alternative: Preservation of the Actual Malice Standard
The actual malice standard remains the most effective means of
resolving defamation disputes because it prevents both plaintiffs' and
defendants' abuse of defamation actions. On one hand, the actual malice standard limits plaintiffs to recovering presumed and punitive damages only upon a showing of actual malice, or in the case of private
plaintiffs, to the extent of actual injury. On the other hand, because
large presumed and punitive damages can be awarded upon a showing

103. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
104. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
592-93 (1983); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
105. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133-34 n.16 (1979) (The Court has never decided whether the New York Times standard can apply to a non-media defendant.).
106. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 683-84.
107. See Wiley & Frank, supra note 71, at 33, col. 3.
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of actual malice, the standard deters defendants from speaking with
impunity. In contrast, without the actual malice standard, defamation
litigation will become plaintiff oriented. If there were no actual malice
standard but rather a limit placed on the liability that could be incurred,10 8 defamation litigation would become pro defendant by allowing the future defendant to calculate the cost versus the benefit of
disseminating a malicious, false statement. Justice White's concurrence
in Dun & Bradstreet raises the notion that the actual malice standard
is detrimental to the essential dignity of the person in that an injured
plaintiff may not recover any damages until a showing of actual malice.109 But in Gertz, the Supreme Court specifically declared that a private plaintiff may establish liability on the basis of a negligence standard. 110 Therefore, a "private plaintiff" would be able to receive
damages for actual loss and the opportunity to clear his or her name.11
This makes the actual malice standard less oppres§ive than a limited
liability standard since under limited liability a defendant could publish
malicious and false information with a limited penalty for doing so. At
the same time the Gertz actual malice standard avoids the dangerous
consequences of defamation actions without such a standard.
D. Summation of Court's Present Position on Defamation Litigation:
The Three-Prong Analysis
The United States Supreme Court's present position on defamation litigation may be properly characterized as a "three-prong" analysis. Up to and including Dun and Bradstreet, the Court has analyzed
defamation actions in light of three distinct characteristics, namely, (1)
the status of the plaintiff, i.e. public v. private; (2) the status of the
defendant, i.e. media v. non-media; and (3) the nature of the speech at
issue, i.e. public v. private.
The three-prong analysis may be best explained by emphasizing
the three landmark defamation decisions. The first decision, New York
Times, involved a public plaintiff, a media defendant, and public
speech. " 2 The Court adopted an actual malice standard, which requires a public plaintiff to demonstrate actual malice on the part of the
defendant in order to recover any form of damages.11 3 The second decision, Gertz, involved a private plaintiff, a media defendant, and public

108.
109.
110.
II.
112.
113.

See Dun & Bradstreet. 105 S. Ct. at 2952 (White, J., concurring).
Id.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-47.
Id.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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speech. " 4 Here, a private plaintiff is able to establish liability on the
basis of negligence, which enables the recovery of nominal damages in
dorder to clear reputational harm.1 1 5 However, by preserving the actual
malice standard, a private plaintiff may not recover presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice. " ' But unlike the
public plaintiff, the private plaintiff may still be compensated for actual
injury. 1 7 The third decision, Dun & Bradstreet, involved a private
plaintiff, a non-media defendant, and private speech. 8 In this situation
the private plaintiff may recover presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice.11 9 Thus, given the existence of three
separate prongs of analysis, the public/private distinction within each
prong, and the difference in outcome resulting among the three
landmark defamation decisions, it is clear that the United States Supreme Court is applying a three-prong analysis in attempting to resolve
defamation disputes.
In light of Dun & Bradstreet, the three-prong analysis is of paramount importance to litigants of future defamation actions. The obvious distinction between the first two decisions, New York Times and
Gertz, and the most recent decision, Dun & Bradstreet, is the "speech"
prong. Unlike the earlier two decisions, the speech at issue in Dun &
Bradstreet is of a private nature. 120 However, closer scrutiny of the
three prongs reveals another difference between the earlier two cases
and Dun & Bradstreet, namely, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., is a non-media defendant. Thus, in Dun & Bradstreet,all three prongs of the analysis are arguably of a private nature. Therefore, based upon a threeprong analysis of defamation actions, it is plausible to contend that the
private nature of the three prongs in Dun & Bradstreet was the motivating force for the Court's allowance of presumed and punitive damages absent actual malice,121 or in the alternative, the private or nonthe
media nature of the defendant was significant enough to persuade
1 22
private.
merely
as
issue
at
speech
the
characterize
Court to
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's elimination of the actual malin Dun & Bradstreet, a defamation case involving speech
standard
ice
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323. See supra note 42.
See supra note 43.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
Id.
Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2941.
Id. at 2948.
Id. at 2944-45.
See supra notes 101-107 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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of a private nature, creates an ill-conceived precedent. By establishing
an extremely vague, fact-sensitive public speech/private speech distinction, the Supreme Court has in effect chilled communication in a
predominantly commercial national economy. Furthermore, by apparently favoring media defendants over non-media defendants, the Court
has inevitably hindered the free speech value of the first amendment.
The best method for maintaining the delicate balance between reputation and freedom of expression is the actual malice standard. Had this
standard been applied to the present action, Plaintiff, a private corporation, would still have been able to recover any economic damages it
suffered and also Plaintiff could have cleared its reputation. The recovery of presumed and punitive damages would have been available only
upon a showing of actual malice in order to protect Defendant's interest in freedom of expression. Unfortunately for future litigants of defamation actions, the United States Supreme Court has erroneously decided to abandon the actual malice standard in defamation actions
involving speech on so-called private matters, a standard which
uniquely preserves the vital interests of reputation and freedom of
expression.
Lawrence J. Spegar
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